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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-2180
________________
QIU RONG CHEN,
Petitioner
v.
*Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent
*(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c))
____________________________________
On Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. 79-417-364)
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 22, 2005
Before: ROTH, MCKEE AND ALDISERT, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: August 16,2 005 )

_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM

I.
Qiu Rong Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China entered the
United States in August 2001. Chen conceded her removability for not having proper
documentation, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and sought political asylum based on her
Falun Gong 1 activities. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Chen’s testimony not
credible and denied asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. The IJ further noted that if, upon review, Chen’s testimony
is found to be credible, then a grant of asylum would be appropriate. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed without opinion. Chen now petitions for review.
II.
Where, as in this case, the BIA defers to the IJ’s decision, the Court reviews the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination under the substantial evidence standard. Mulanga v.
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 2003). We will uphold the IJ’s findings “to the
extent that they are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole, and will reverse those findings only if there is evidence so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude as the [IJ] did.” Id. (quotations
omitted).

1

Falun Gong is a practice that “blends aspects of Taoism, Buddhism, and the
meditation techniques of Qigong (a traditional martial art) with the teachings of Li
Hongzhi.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). For
immigration purposes, Falun Gong is viewed as an imputed political opinion and a
religion. Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 719-20 (9 th Cir. 2004).
2

We have reviewed the record in its entirety and we find that the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination supported by reasonable and substantial evidence. In particular,
there are discrepancies between Chen’s credible fear interview, asylum application, and
testimony that involve the heart of her asylum claim. In her asylum application Chen
stated that she practiced Falun Gong in China every Sunday, whereas she testified that she
practiced once or twice a month on Mondays. A.R. 53, 76, 91, 168. At her credible fear
interview, conducted ten days after her arrival in the United States, Chen stated that her
parents had been detained, but on cross examination at the hearing she testified that her
parents had never been detained. A.R. 54-55, 98, 184. In the asylum application Chen
stated that after her two days of detention in May 2001 her parents were “very worried”
and decided to send her away, but at the hearing Chen testified that she left because after
her May arrest the police learned she was still practicing Falun Gong and in July 2001
came to her house to arrest her again. A.R. 55, 83, 169. These discrepancies and
omissions are directly related to Chen’s claim of persecution, and as such provide an
adequate basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Berishaj v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that discrepancies involving the heart of
the asylum claim provide basis for adverse credibility findings, whereas minor
inconsistencies that reveal nothing about applicant’s fear do not support adverse
credibility findings).
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
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